INTRODUCTION

"Responding to the new Terrorists: Contemporary Cases and Emerging Priorities"
Ambassador W. Nathaniel Howell, Dr. Gregory Saathoff, and Dr. Lawrence Adams

The Critical Incident Analysis Group is a research project, located at the University of Virginia, whose goal is to consider the public and personal effects of discreet and defined critical incidents. CIAG is interested both operationally and intellectually in anticipating, ameliorating, and understanding those kinds of traumatic or critical events that have the capacity to impact communities and social structures adversely and to undermine public faith in the confidence of democratic institutions. In April, 1999 over 30 individuals from government, from academia, from the private sector, from the media -- who have unusual experience with terrorist phenomena and possess insights that can help point CIAG and others in the direction of further research and action – met in Charlottesville, Virginia in a structured, two-day consultation. This consultation dealt with the 'Terrorist Threat to America's Overseas Presence' because terrorist incidents demonstrably have the capability to sap and undermine public institutions in the popular sense of confidence and well being. While there are numerous aspects of this issue that are in need of clarification, many of the more pressing and immediate developments were addressed effectively and eloquently during this brief gathering.

For this publication, we have chosen a selection of remarks that represent the lasting value of the analysis that was undertaken by the entire gathering. Another lasting result, impossible to capture in a publication like this, was the developing network of relationships among professionals and analysts surely to be employed both in situations of necessary action and when further analysis is warranted.

Finally, anyone who has visited the University of Virginia knows that no gathering here can proceed without a reference to Thomas Jefferson. This consultation met during the 256th anniversary of Mr. Jefferson's birth -- Founder's Day at the University. His impressive visage, and the spirit of inquiry that he embodied, shined upon this meeting, and guided our concerns for the preservation and enrichment of American democracy.

Report on the Attacks on American Embassies in Africa

A most illuminating feature of the consultation, which for reasons of security as well as the limitations of publication cannot be fully reproduced, was a briefing by investigators of the attacks by loyalists of Osama Bin-Ladin on the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania on August 7, 1998. These attacks had many effects, including the elevation of Bin-Ladin to public status as Global Terrorist Supremo. It should, however, be clear in the presentations included in this report how the major observations and lessons of that investigation helped shape the consultation that followed.

In particular, the obvious lesson that the United States is a special target of political terrorists due to its power and role in the world was supplemented by aspects of American vulnerability that become clear in these incidents. This vulnerability can affect commerce and travel, and more
insidiously the well-being and trust necessary to global cooperation and democratic governance. For example, the need for American facilities to be accessible to travelling Americans as well as others provides a formidable security challenge.

The attacks on the embassies in Africa were case studies in physical vulnerability. The Nairobi embassy especially was vulnerable, given its location on a dense urban street. The surrounding buildings provided channels of destruction for the bomb blast, and the use of preliminary explosions to attract attention increased the loss of life – as curious workers rushed to the windows to check on the noise in the streets. Bin-Ladin’s choice of these targets also was a lesson in terrorist strategy, as they were considered unlikely targets with marginal interest. Ironically, they may have been more susceptible to attack as security resources had been concentrated on other areas of the world (such as the Middle East and Europe) where attacks were considered highly likely.

The participants in this consultation, as their remarks demonstrate, gave ample consideration to the expectations of similar attacks. Discussion ranged over the likely frequency of attacks, the possibilities of security, and whether the instruments of terror would develop from bombs to the use of even more deadly “mass destruction” weapons – biological, chemical, nuclear. A general theme was the impossibility of 100% security and prevention, and the political infeasibility of trying to achieve it. Yet, many participants are strongly convinced that the U.S. can improve significantly in its preventive intelligence, its security preparedness, and in its ability to respond quickly and control damage. Those who were on the scene in Kenya and Tanzania reported the extensive efforts at coordination and cooperation among agencies and governments that are among the chief results of these incidents.

One purpose of this consultation was to help set a research and consultation agenda for the Critical Incident Analysis Group. This has been achieved, as much has been identified for future work. One agreement was to convene another consultation in 2000 that will deal with threats to domestic symbols of democracy and order – such as the U.S. Capitol, other federal buildings and monuments, and local symbols such as churches and schools. In late 2000 or early 2001, another consultation will consider the impact of political assassination, as well as its prevention.

The CIAG goal to lay before the academy, government and the public the requirement for constant vigilance in the maintenance of public trust and democratic commitment was constantly before us in this consultation. The reader may judge the degree to which we have successfully conveyed that in this publication. Participants were without reservation in the sense that it had been achieved among them in their meeting together.

CIAG invites inquiries into its work, as well as any regarding the content of this publication.

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Part I. Contemporary Categories and Patterns of Terrorism

1. The Nature of the Threat
   The Honorable John O. Marsh, Jr.

   Our governmental structure is having difficulty coming to grips with the new modalities that are being required by the new threat of terrorism. Having gone through the atomic age and the Cold War, I'm reminded of the problems that occurred in the 1950s in structuring, both in the armed forces and other security organizations, our government to accommodate nuclear energy and nuclear weapons.

   The nature of the terrorist threat is a very pervasive one that has many faces. I am a trustee of IDA, a federally-funded research development research institute which stands for Institute for Defense Analysis, and it's in the forefront of doing virtual simulation and structuring virtual models into which you can introduce terrorism as a factor in order to frame responses. The Institute is headed by an extraordinary individual -- Gen. Larry Welsh who's the former chief of staff of the Air Force. He and I have been involved in the Joint Vaccine Accelerated Program (JVAC) and I would tell you -- on many of the issues of counterterrorism and dealing with catastrophic instances should they occur, that we are a day late and a dollar short. I talked just recently with the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Dr. Hamre, in reference to this and he was somewhat interested in some of the programs that we're seeking to get started, and they have offered to do the briefings. There are being proposed extraordinary changes inside the Department and in the national security apparatus of our country. But these changes do not occur without authorization by law and without understanding by the American public as to why these changes have to be made.

   When I talked with Dr. Hamre several weeks ago, the Pentagon had been closed a couple of days before. One whole side had been closed because there was discovered a powder that had been sprinkled along one of the corridors and the perception was that this could've been an anthrax powder. The building was evacuated and closed. It turned out it was Metimucil, but it had been done deliberately to try to cast a fear. If you talk with some people in government, they do not talk in terms of it's a possibility of a significant terrorist attack. They talk in terms of probability. The question is not if. The question is when.

   Similarly, there is a problem of the movement of deadly toxins that are used on a regular basis by the most reputable hospitals and research institutions in this country, such as the hospital here at the University of Virginia, Johns Hopkins, etc. Those deadly viruses move in a regular market. They are advertised. They can be obtained by anyone who wants them. There has been a statute adopted that does penalize the individual that acquires the deadly viruses for the purpose with a criminal intent. It's very difficult to prove, but you couldn't do very much with every incident.

   About 2 years ago the president designated and directed a study be made on what was called the Critical Information Structure of the United States -- not too well known. The study was done by a namesake. It was done by Tom Marsh, United States Air Force retired, a graduate of West Point 1949. Tom and I talked because at that time I was doing a study for Dr. Hamre on another dimension of the defense activity. We talked about this report together. His report, a presidential report, has been referred to the National Security Council, and they're having some difficulties putting this together and turning it into legislation. It relates to the vulnerabilities of the grid system, the power grid systems, the rail station switching systems and other things that rely on technology and with recommendations to address the many questions that are raised.

   This gets into such situations as if you had a catastrophic incident and your total response at the state and local level was impotent. There are in the United States what are called the insurrection statutes. The insurrection statutes scare people in most circumstances. They
authorize the military to come in and provide the law and order when necessary. The insurrection statutes have been raised in reference to homeland defense. There is a second statute which was adopted in 1868 that is a benchmark in our country which the FBI scrupulously has observed and which the United States scrupulously observes, called posse comitatus. This law does not permit a member of the federal armed forces, the Army, to make arrests in a community, which is one reason that we use the Guard so frequently because if we call the Guard up in a certain status, the Guard can do that.

Now, it is being suggested inside the Department of the Defense that an organization called DOMS, Director of Military Support, become a crisis coordination agency including the Bureau of Prisons to the Coast Guard, to DEA, to the National Fire Service, whereby you can bring in all their assets and apply them to a problem. There are efforts now being made to change DOMS and the structure of DOMS and place it in the homeland defense, since this also involves a civil liberties issue.

Now, there is another proposal which has considerable weight and is likely to happen. This is to retain the National Guard in the Department of Defense in its normal command structure, but instead of Defense and the Guard taking the lead at the crisis site, the lead will be the senior agent of the FBI at the crisis site, who will command the National Guard.

I have reviewed some of these issues because these are the ones that relate to law. I am likely to accept a task as adjunct professor at the College of William and Mary to develop legal programs that relate to posse comitatus insurrection statutes and encryption. When you get into the cyber-field information infrastructure there is enormous debate on the encryption of messages which is now currently controlled. There's going to have to be a resolution that is temporarily resolved by some changes in the Export Control Act. The American public are frightened to death by encryption because the question occurs -- do you have to give the encryption key to the FBI and if you do, who controls how they get that encryption. For example, if a federal agency responds to a crisis and they have to use, or the Army responds to a crisis on the domestic scene, there is a statute that has got more teeth than you can believe called the Antideficiency Efficiency Statute. This Statue requires whenever one federal agent uses assets or services of another federal agency the agency that is using the assets must reimburse out of their budget those funds back to the organization that contributed.

So what does this amount to? I guess what I've done is raise more questions than I've answered, but it occurs to me that we are where we were in the mid-50s addressing the Cold War which, in my view, was a much closer race than most people thought and in the 1950s I think we were losing that war and that was turned around. It was a different type of war because it was fought on the "twilight battlefield" -- not just with military but also psychological, economic and other assets. Shortly after the turn of the century, Lenin wrote a book titled What Is to be Done? I think that's the title that we need to think about right here -- what is to be done? Now, for example, you have on the campus of the University of Virginia the Army JAG School which is considered to be one of the stars in the crown of the military judicial system. They are working these issues I'm raising. A number of the issues I am presenting to you came to me through that JAG School, so if I were to say what is to be done, I think we need to copy or look at the record of an organization that's established out of that work called the National Strategy Information Center. It sought to bring some order out of chaos and became a collection agency for sound materials and a sponsoring agency for people who would go out and speak and could address these in non-partisan ways with sound documents and doctrine and consequently begin to change American opinion.

Something like that should be established and deployed in this new crisis situation. Such an outcome would be a fine result of a conference such as this. Thank you very much.
2. "Aleythmia"
Frank M. Ochberg, M.D.

I wish there were a vaccine for psychiatric disease and for the impact of psychological warfare. There isn't and perhaps what we do here is the best remedy that we can envision--a collective meeting of the minds, and anticipating new ways of disrupting and confounding us. I've been involved in this type of discussion since 1975, and I'm glad to see a State Department publication that reminds us of the history of modern terrorism which goes back approximately three decades to the times of Carlos the Jackal and Baader Meinhoff and Red Brigades and PFLP and the types of theatrical lethal events that they engaged in. Those were the beginning of our concerns which brought together military, police and mental health specialists. My role became eventually one of studying the victim rather than the mentality of the perpetrator, but colleagues of mine have perfected those studies and on the panel we'll hear a little bit more about psychological profiles that get to motivations of the leaders and the members of these groups.

Two ironic and important consequences came out of my studies and those of colleagues. One that you know of -- and there are people here like Steve Romano who is more of an expert than I am -- is the Stockholm Syndrome. I'm the one who put the phrase into the medical literature. I didn't invent the phrase, but Stockholm Syndrome refers to that ironic paradoxical set of positive feelings that a victim has toward somebody who could kill them, who perhaps has killed others and who doesn't kill them and who is in close proximity. So back in the '70s -- not beginning with the 1973 Stockholm incident, it was clearly observed by FBI agents before in kidnap events -- we began to see some of these ironic outcomes where there is paradoxical gratitude to the point of love on the part of a person who is held hostage. Now, that hostage is very appealing to all of us. This makes good television. We identify with those hostages, and the phenomena of having an irrational interest and possibly even affection for a lethal perpetrator can occur by proxy, so we have to attend to some of the psychological observations that come from studying the victim.

Another issue is Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. What is ironic about PTSD is that you have haunting intrusive recollections of horrifying events and you think you're going crazy because your mind dials up the worst days of your life and confronts you with it when you don't expect it and don't want it. At the same time that you have that, you also have an opposite reaction of feeling numb and detached and in some ways not caring, so there is episodic caring very much and then there is a lack of expression. It even reaches the point where in artificially induced flashbacks when subjects have PET scans, MRIs, you can see underperfusion of the speech center of the brain. Roberta Culbertson has been interested in these issues from the literary point of view. Cultures that have gone through shocking extremes often lack a language to talk about what they have been through.

One of my colleagues coined the term "alexythmia" -- lack of a language for feeling. He coined it before there was evidence that it was neurological, so literature, psychology, and neurology help us confront our lack of a language for terror and harm. Part of what we're doing, I believe, collectively in different ways is restoring a voice to these events.

As you know, I've had an opportunity to work closely with the media. That part of the equation shows us the role of the media and particularly the way that we might cultivate public affairs expertise in our bureaucracy at terribly important stages of responding to the terrorist threat. I developed a chart 25 years ago and called it a hostage incident flow chart but it can be adapted to represent critical incident analysis. Let me describe it to you. On your left, is the incident. Now it doesn't matter whether it is a terrorist who's holding hostages or a bombing that is complete and then people go back to the scene of the incident to investigate, this is the arena of action. Here in time and place is where the horror happens and let me point out that we are not dealing with mega-violence. We're not talking about millions and millions of people losing their lives. We're talking about the kind of losses that we tolerate in highway carnage all the time, but because it has been devised for political purpose, we immediately question our ability as authorized
interveners to protect, to prevent, to respond adequately. The terrorist threatens victims by holding them hostage, by assassinating them, by bombing something. In the incident things occur. Sometimes those terrorists actually make demands at the time. "We're doing this and we'll do it again unless..." Sometimes they don't do this. But there is a signal that is sent explicitly or implicitly from the incident into the political arena. I want to come to the political arena last. The media reports from the ground, from the incident.

Over here on the right is the executive branch. In the case of a private company, it's the company. It's the way, through its ministerial or policy level or board, it delegates various authorities to those, not just the police, who then are expected to take some form of action. But let me point out that yesterday we had a wonderful example to kick things off in the case study of the Africa bombings, but it was an example of FBI investigation after the fact and those agents had a particular circumscribed mission. Their job did not include assessing the morale of those people who were directly affected. It didn't include a political analysis of whether that country was being affected, destabilized in any way. That's wasn't part of their brief, but when we respond, CIAG, CIRG, America, to provocations, we have to bear in mind that it isn't just a matter of saving the lives here. Here's what it ends up being about, in my opinion. There is a political arena in a democracy. Jack Marsh just said government structure is having difficulty coming to grips with new modalities. Well, this is government structure in one sense of the term, but the real heart of a democracy is the trust that the public has for the government and the government has for the public. When the government stops trusting the public, we have martial law, draconian measures, suspension of civil liberties. There are times when this is necessary, and perhaps to protect the democracy we have to think about what needs to be on the books in a worst-case scenario when there is massive disaffection or rioting or breakdown of law and order. It has happened in other countries.

Similarly, we've been fortunate -- whether you approve of this president or not -- we have public approval of the presidency, the Congress, the institutions of government; our democracy survives. When that gets weakened, the modern expression of terrorism has succeeded. Theorists from the terrorists' point of view back in the early 70s who described what they were about suggested that by performing events, incidents, that were so horrifying they, the revolutionary group, wouldn't be blamed. The leaders of our democracy would be blamed for failing to deal effectively with them, and we would be destabilized and the revolution would occur. The only places where this did occur, it didn't reach the point of the People's Revolution but it certainly reached the point of governmental repression -- in Uruguay and other countries. So I think that this kind of a chart enables us as a critical incident analysis group to focus on the incident. I'd rather call this instead of bureaucracy the authorized intervenors and then on the equation of democracy which is a matter of trust among government and governed.

Roberta Culbertson mentioned something to me last night at dinner. She is analyzing the leadership of Ambassador Nat Howell in various parts of his career, but particularly in responding to the assault of the U.S. embassy in Kuwait and she described how in that mode he has the qualities of a tribal leader. Now Roberta is an author and an anthropologist and by tribal leader she was not throwing you back to some atavistic Neantherthal man. It was a reflection of her study. It may take the skill of anthropology to understand some of the events that occur, not just to the incident but the bureaucracy when we are provoked. How many times have I debriefed intervenors who said this was easy, the incident was easy. It's coming back home and dealing with the director or the colleagues of the bureaucracy because I can innovate over here and they're not on the front line and you get your ass in a sling when you do what is necessary in the incident and perhaps you don't have the same support you'd like over on this end, so this is getting destabilized. Anthropology helps us deal with both the rituals in a siege room and the rituals in a bureaucracy.
3. **Millenialism and Terrorism**  
**Michael Barkun**

Many of you will recall a 1996 article in Foreign Affairs, entitled "Postmodern Terrorism," by Walter Laqueur. In it, Laqueur emphasized not only the role of religion in contemporary terrorism but more particularly apocalyptic religion. As he put it: "Extremist millenarians would like to give history a push, helping create world-ending havoc…" While none of this was exactly news to those of us already interested in millennialism, he clearly thought it needed spelling out for the readers of Foreign Affairs.

With the year 2000 just over the time horizon, ideas such as this have lost much of their novelty. "Millennium" is the current buzzword in virtually every area, including terrorism studies. But to wave it about as a talisman is not necessarily to understand it or make it useful. Indeed, it seems to me, the more it is bandied about, the more it is misunderstood. Let me therefore suggest six principles that apply to the intersection of terrorism and apocalyptic beliefs:

First, no religious tradition has a monopoly on the potential for millennial violence. I say this in part because of the current fixation on Islamic fundamentalism, and in part because some of the most violent millenarian groups are not clearly situated within any single religious tradition. The most dramatic case is Aum Shinrikyo, for while Shoko Asahara used substantial elements of Buddhism, he also utilized themes from Hinduism, the New Testament Book of Revelation, and the prophecies of Nostradamus. In this he was typical rather than exceptional. We have entered a period when "millenarian entrepreneurs," aided by the Internet, are borrowing with abandon from many religious and secular traditions to create strange and idiosyncratic new combinations, what I have elsewhere called the "improvisational millenarian style."

Second, there is often no clear difference between religious millennialism and secular conspiracy theories. The "New World Order" conspiracy theories that have proliferated in the English-speaking world, particularly in militia circles, appear in both religious and non-religious versions that differ only slightly from one another. In part because conspiracy theories are closed systems of ideas that resist falsification, they are also highly adaptable, and thus are equally available to millenarians anticipating the end-times as well as anti-government militants. In fact, "New World Order" ideas increasingly serve as a common language that links a variety of religious and political radicalisms.

Third, targets that make sense to a millennialist may not make sense to someone else. The reverse is also true: what you or I might think would be a "natural" target might seem irrelevant to someone operating from within a millenarian belief system. As irrational as such systems might seem to outsiders, they have an internal logic which we ignore at our peril. They make sense to believers, however unconvincing they may appear to others. Having spent the last several years trying to find my way through the byzantine complexities of conspiracy theories, I have come to appreciate just how different are the worldviews of those who accept them. Let me give just two examples: A considerable literature now exists, mostly on the Internet, about the nefarious activities that allegedly go on underneath the Australian Parliament building in Canberra, where -- supposedly -- there is a giant computer that regulates "New World Order" activities for the Southern Hemisphere. A somewhat similar set of beliefs about subterranean evil has proliferated about the new Denver Airport, underneath whose terminal building unspeakable things are supposed to be going on -- other than tearing up travellers' suitcases. I mention these particularly bizarre cases by way of a cautionary note -- that we need to be careful not to impose our own concepts of rationality; rather, we need to think ourselves into the mind-sets of others who may see the world differently. We need to be careful as well about making hard-and-fast distinctions between symbolic targets and infrastructural targets, since what may appear symbolic to one party may be part of the infrastructure to another. Thus, well before the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building, it was common to find conspiracy theorists specifically referring to the federal law enforcement presence in Oklahoma City as part of the "New World Order's" infrastructure.
Fourth, counter-terrorism measures that gratuitously confirm conspiratorialists' fears do more harm than good. To be sure, almost any counter-terrorism measure will be viewed with suspicion by someone. Some of these measures, however, do so unnecessarily and in the process exacerbate the problem they are intended to control. One would have thought that the Waco tragedy had fully sensitized us to the danger of inadvertently fulfilling apocalyptic expectations, but the lesson has yet to be fully learned. I think, for example, about the incident in the Corpus Christi, Texas, area last February, when, as you may remember, a Special Forces unit decided to practice its skills on some abandoned buildings. Without telling either the general public or many of the local officials, it descended, in black helicopters no less, in the process creating a furor not only in the locality but among anti-government groups across the country. While one hopes the troops' combat skills were improved, an unintended byproduct was to confirm the beliefs of potentially volatile elements.

Fifth, no one yet knows how to reliably distinguish a dangerously activist millenarian movement from a passive one, and anyone who says they can do so reliably is either fooling you or themselves. Despite all our best efforts, the predictive enterprise is at a rudimentary stage. Millenialists' conviction that the existing order is evil and will be the target of divine wrath can just as easily produce political passivity as it can terrorism. In a domestic context, this is particularly important to recognize in light of the sensitive constitutional issues involved, which impinge directly on the First Amendment's protection of religious free exercise. There do, however, appear to be some features associated with the potential for violence. One is the existence of a belief that the faithful are trapped and must act now or be destroyed. Individuals in such a situation may feel they have nothing to lose by resorting to violence. They may feel physically trapped, as in a barricade situation, but they may also feel trapped by time if they feel history is literally coming to an end -- a reaction particularly common as the year 2000 approaches. Another is the presence of violence directed within the group, against those believed to be spies, infiltrators, defectors, or doctrinal deviants. Such internal violence may prepare a group for subsequent action against external enemies, as it did in the cases of both The Order and Aum Shinrikyo. On the other hand, internal violence can also reach the level of group self-destruction, as it did in the cases of the People's Temple, the Order of the Solar Temple, and Heaven's Gate.

Finally, don't breathe a sigh of relief when the year 2000 finally ends twenty-one months from now. While the millennial year is a significant factor that can amplify the potential for violence, its termination will not bring the threat of millenarian violence to an end. In the first place, most millenarian violence has historically had little or nothing to do with millennial years. Second, predictions of upheaval currently circulating among millenarians extend out to at least 2010 and beyond -- in part, because millenarians use many different systems of calculation, and in part because they wish to hedge their bets by pushing dramatic predictions farther into the future.

These factors come into play even if a given individual does not belong to a group whose millenarian views might produce violent outcomes. The media-rich environment in which most of us live, and pre-eminently the Internet, allows individuals to participate vicariously in the surrounding apocalyptic culture. They may have no formal connection with any organization, yet accept others' beliefs as their own. Unfortunately, that makes them largely untraceable, while giving the group involved plausible deniability. This has been elevated to a strategic principle by the Christian Identity writer Louis Beam with his widely noted concept of "leaderless resistance" -- the principle that individuals and small cells should commit acts of violence independently, without consulting others, whenever they feel the situation requires it. Through it, the individual terrorist can act out his violent designs for whatever personal gratification that gives, while at the same time remaining convinced that he has served some larger set of purposes, whether advancing a religious end-time scenario or some politics of ultimate meaning.
4. **Motivations to Terrorism**  
Professor Alan Sapp

The role of motive is important as a very useful investigative tool for leading us to the perpetrators of a given incident. I think of motive as being intermediary, if you will, to ideology on one side with ideology being a way of thinking that expresses values and beliefs. Ideology then leads to motives and the motive in turn when acted on leads to the behavior, and in an interaction between two people you can see the ideology and the behavior tied together very closely.

In law enforcement, in things like terrorist incidents, we have to work in reverse. We have to start with the behavior and then try, from the behavior that we see at the scene and what our analysis tells us, to try to determine the motive and then from there we can go back into the basic ideology. I would suggest to you that there are four basic elements for trying to analyze and determine motive.

The first I would label as the terrorists themselves. There are a number of different things to look at -- is this state-sponsored? We know state-sponsored terrorism has been on the decline. Is this an organized group like we've seen with some of the transnational groups that are appearing, or are we dealing with individuals or individuals that are perpetrating this particular act? In understanding that, the terrorist in their associations gives us some clue as to motives.

The second area is an analysis of the target. Targets can be selected for a number of reasons – for example, economic, and I would suggest that the World Trade Center was an economic target in the sense that it was striking at the economy. Was that the sole symbolism of that target? Probably not. Oklahoma City may have been defined as a political administrative type of target. The embassies are perhaps best described as governmental. Attacks against industry may be economic in nature or they may be nationalist in nature in the case of the international. Some targets are selected as revolutionary targets -- the idea that by attacking this target you ultimately lead to revolution. Religious targets are chosen because of religious background; and certainly sometimes those things can be combined, so that you have religio-political types of targets or you have nationalist/economic/political targets. You certainly can combine in many different ways. Sometimes we ignore secondary effects where the secondary effects of the target selection may be as important to the terrorist as our analysis of the primary motives.

The question of some of the narco-terrorism in Colombia is an example. This is economic -- it's over who is going to control the drug market. Who is going to control the government is also a factor. It's a secondary factor. When the drug cartels reach the point where they can challenge the government, they were attacking by political and even revolutionary secondary effects. I think it's very important that we look at the targets from the viewpoint of what's the significance of the target and how does that relate to perhaps the ideology.

Third, we remember back in the late '70s that Marshall McLuhan talked about the medium. He said the medium is the message, and I think that where we look at the event itself that we can begin to see some of the ideologies. We can talk about whether or not there was a threat, whether or not there were actual warnings, whether this was out-of-the-blue type of event. The level of the event -- a kidnapping versus an assassination, and then small scale explosives -- the pipe bomb types of things. We can look at the larger scale conventional types of weapons that we saw in the embassy cases that we looked at yesterday. And moving up the scale into the chemical or biological -- such as the Aum Shinrikyo attack -- the threat of anthrax; and of course, the peak of any kind of terrorist medium would be the use of a nuclear weapon.

I think that it's important for us to recognize that every terrorist act carries a message -- and it may carry a number of messages that are culturally defined. We may not recognize those kinds of things. As we were talking yesterday, Richard Landes turned to me and asked, "do you know
what Dar es Salaam means" and I said no. It means "realm of peace." Is there a significance in selecting a target within the realm of peace for a terrorist attack? Is there a significance that the particular weapon includes the oxygen tanks that made the huge fireball with what from the crater we could see looked like a relatively much smaller explosive load? Is there a symbolism in the firebomb and is this simply a politically motivated anti-U.S. government attack on an embassy? Terrorists operate within a world view and our worldview sometimes doesn't even come close to understanding it, so when we think about an act as purely a political terrorism, we need to try to get into the world view of the individual perpetrators. Let me suggest to you purely as a thinking exercise some things about the world view of the people who carried those bombings out and the significance of those in terms of the message.

On one hand, we had a large urban area where obviously a massive amount of explosives were used to create maximum damage. The supposition that the grenade and the gun fire were to bring people to the windows was clearly a situation where the message was maximum injury and death, not only to the people in the embassy but to the people in the surrounding building. So while this may be an attack against American interests, I would suggest to you that it also is an attack against the Kenyan government and the people of Kenya. Now contrast that with what's taking place four minutes later down in Tanzania in Dar es Salaam where you have a relatively small bomb that is enhanced to make a massive fire ball to give maximum exposure to the idea that a blast has taken place. Clearly in this case it is targeted against the American embassy because there's basically nothing else around but a few houses. What's the symbolism of the fire bomb against the concrete constructed building? How much damage are you going to do to the embassy with a fireball that resulted from the oxygen and acetylene? I would suggest to you that in the world view here, the mere fact that this took place in the "realm of peace" may have been a message to the people about political aspirations of the group; but it also was a message to the people that even in the "realm of peace," we can reach out and touch you, you're not safe within the realm of peace.

In summary, I think that it's important that we look at motive because it helps us perhaps understand this arena of ideology -- the way people think and believe -- and it helps us understand their world view. Until we do begin to understand the world view of those people who do not share our own world view we're always going to be, as Jack Marsh said this morning, behind the eight ball. We're always going to be reacting down the line rather than being able to be more proactive and more preventive in nature.
Part II. Targets and Threat Patterns

1. The Threat to Business and Economic Interests
   Mr. Michael Farmer

   I have to lead off by saying I may take a contrarian point of view in my comments. But I think it's important that an audience like this understand where the corporate thinking is around terrorism and how we approach these issues and what kind of mind set we have around terrorism. I'm going to take some issue with a couple of things that have been said already and some of the statistics -- or at least the interpretation of some of the statistics -- that have been put on the table in the last day.

   You need to understand that private business and particularly large multinational corporations view international terrorism from a significantly different context than does a government agency. In many ways, we're dealing with what is in fact a much less complex problem than government agencies have to deal with. Terrorism is one of a number of risks that international business faces on a daily basis, and in most places and at most times it's a not major risk or concern. Certainly Osama Bin Laden and his rhetoric is a concern, but it's not a new concern. We've heard rhetoric before. We've seen attacks before. We're not discounting Osama Bin Laden as a possible risk to international business but constantly try to keep it in the context of what we dealt with in the past.

   And finally you have to be able to separate the hype around the issue of terrorism, the kind of vendor marketing that goes on with corporations. My chairman and my office are inundated on almost a weekly basis with scare documents trying to convince us that the world is ending and terrorists are at the doorstep of every Mobil facility around the world. But luckily they're available to help us solve the problem for a nominal sum. We also have to respond to governmental bulletins, and I have to tell you quite frankly, a lot of the government bulletins that come out about terrorism really do more harm in the corporate environment than they help. It does not do any good for me as a business manager to have a bulletin shooting around my corporation that says, "Beware! something is about to happen somewhere sometime to somebody," and that is basically the level that a lot of these bulletins are. They have to be that way for a number of reasons -- some political, but mainly because they have to reach a much broader and less sophisticated audience than the audience within a corporation like Mobil corporation that has people all around the world who are very sophisticated both in travel and operations overseas.

   There are a few key points that I'd like to talk about in terms of terrorism. First of all, as I said, terrorism is a concern. It is not our major concern. I am much more concerned about the exposure of our employees to international street crime, international fraud, extortion, country upheavals, and rioting unrelated to terrorism. We have literally hundreds of times more casualties due to international traffic accidents than terrorism. I'm reminded of Brian Jenkins who's a friend and colleague. Brian once was asked if he had to advise international business travelers on one thing that would reduce their risk if they traveled overseas what that would be. Brian, who is quite knowledgeable on terrorism, thought for a minute and said "I think I would advise people to drive very carefully on the way to the airport," because if they can get to the airport, the chances of anything happening to them on an international trip are fairly small.

   So the only point I'm trying to make is to keep thing in perspective. Unfortunately, popular press accounts make that difficult. We spend a lot of time countering inaccurate and misleading information. Business people have to travel and operate internationally and in a company like Mobil they have to travel and operate in some of the worst places in the world. Oil, unfortunately was not placed in suburban Paris and all the other wonderful places I would like to visit. There's a lot of it in Nigeria. There's a lot of it in Colombia and Peru. There's a lot of it in Indonesia -- so that's where we have to be. Mobil is not in the business of being secure. Mobil is in the business of making money and security is only important to the extent that it helps us make money. That's
a crass way to say it but you have to understand that that is very much the mental state of businesses and business managers.

We have an existing security infrastructure that is very strong, very good. It can be enhanced if we get specific threats, but we depend on that infrastructure. When there is a specific threat we take reasonable tactical security steps to address that specific threat.

Statistically, let me talk a little bit about 1997 as a good jumping off point. Seven Americans died in international terrorist attacks by most definitions in 1997. There were 123, or 120 -- I've seen different numbers -- anti-U.S. incidents. The statistics that we saw earlier show there were a significant number of attacks on businesses. However, you've got to look at those statistics very carefully. Virtually 40% of all those U.S. business attacks were against one company in one location -- Oxidental Petroleum Company in Colombia. Their pipeline is blown up about every three or four days on average, and has been every year for the last 10 years. They cost it into their business equations. It's just the nature of doing business there, so I think you need to be real careful in looking at the business statistics. What is going on? Who is being targeted? What is the purpose of it? As I said, it's geographically focused. Most lethal attacks are against government targets, not against business targets. Private citizens and business people that are killed are usually killed incidental to an attack on a government target.

We've talked a lot about "displacement" over the years. I am still looking for the first real example of displacement from a U.S. government target to a U.S. corporation. I don't know of any example. Maybe somebody can give me one, but the reality is the U.S. government is the prime target. There are, quite frankly, lots and lots of targets out there, and we continue to increase the security in government installations but there are still plenty of targets that are soft, and the reality is that will still be the target of choice.

In the corporate world, there is also a hierarchy of targets within corporations. If you happen to work for a defense industry company in some places in the world, you're almost as likely to be a target as a government agency. In a business like I'm in, the oil business, some places in the world you are a high profile target because you're considered to be taking the natural resources out of the country. In other places in the world, that's not an issue, not a concern, so you have to, when you're doing your analysis, look very carefully at your business in the localities where you're operating and what kind of risk profile you have in that locality.

Most of the risk to corporate personnel is incidental exposure. I understand philosophically the issue around displacement, but I think it's often overdone. I think there's a tendency, particularly among government spokesmen, to talk about how all of this increased security at the government level is going to create an increased exposure for corporations, and that scares the hell out of people in the corporate environment. But my answer to that is I haven't seen it yet. If we do see it, we will respond to it, but we have not seen that kind of displacement.

In terms of the way we go about doing risk assessments, we're different from some corporations. We have an internal risk assessment capability. I have analytical capability on my staff. We also contract out with several firms, seven or eight different firms, to help support our risk analysis, but I have to tell you in this group there a lot of charlatans out there selling international terrorism risk assessment. There are people that specialize in going around the world sitting down and talking to the regional security officer in the embassy and then coming back packaging and selling that information to different clients. That's the level of the sophistication of their knowledge of what they're dealing with. We hire what I like to call boutique consultant services, specialists in specific parts of the world who have in-depth knowledge and intelligence contacts in that location where we think we have a particular risk. We put those people on retainer and they're available to work with us. We do not have any contracts with any of the large security firms with one exception and that's a company that we use basically just to track incidents that are happening around the world. We do not take their analysis. We do not
take their advice on what to do about it, but we do use them to track what's happening around the world.

We also have companies that track every mention of Mobil on the Internet. They track every mention of Mobil anywhere in the world's press and keep us apprised of any time our name comes up in any kind of open-source material.

As I said, we focus on specific locations, targets and their philosophy. We operated for a long time in Peru right in the middle of Shining Path territory in the early '90s and we knew the Shining Path better than virtually anybody in the world did. We were out there. We met with them. We talked with them. We played soccer with them.

A little story. Shining Path took over our operations and destroyed a lot of our equipment back in '90 or '91 on a Sunday evening following a Sunday morning soccer game between our contractors and Shining Path in which the contractors won three to two. Our advice after that was if you're going to play soccer with the Shining Path, let them win.

We do assessments that are specific to the Mobil business, specific to locations, operations and our infrastructure. How are we positioned to respond to the threat that we're seeing? In a place like Nigeria, for instance, I have over 1,000 security people in place. We meet every airplane that comes into Nigeria. We have our own buses that are secured. We have our own staff houses. We have our own drivers and cars all security trained. The kind of boilerplate advice that comes out on traveling and working in Nigeria are irrelevant to Mobil. They're very relevant if you're trying to start up a business in Nigeria and you haven't been there. We've been there for 50 years, so we have to deal with the reality of the situation as it affects Mobil.

We lean very heavily on employee awareness. A lot of that employee awareness is provided in training and experience for the people going overseas. For instance, when we were sending people into Peru we required that every employee, before they could accept the job, and their families had to be briefed on the reality of the security environment in Peru. If they chose not to take the job after that there was no penalty and they moved on and did something else. We wanted people that understood the environment and could live with the controls that we were putting around them in terms of their day-to-day life. We have a home page that is updated daily which provides detailed information on virtually every place that Mobil operates, specific down to site locations, so if people are traveling there, considering a job there, need information of any kind, they can get up and review that information on a real-time basis. It also is hooked into several services that we subscribe to that also give them information on everything from the taxis at the airport, what the schools are like, all that kind of information is available to all employees on their computers.

We build, as I said, on our existing infrastructure. We try to get the protection level commensurate with our interpretation of the risk environment. We have to try to minimize disruptions to our business that are created by security measures. Measures have to be cost effective. We don't have the luxury of simply going in and making a series of recommendations because we think they're the best way to reduce the risk to zero. We have to live with the level of risk that makes sense economically. We try to find practical, cost-effective ways to secure our facilities. We do all the standard things. I won't bore you with talking about facilities security, transportation security, residential security, that kind of thing. It's all pretty standard.

And then we lean very heavily on our ability to deal with crises when they do occur. I'd like to close out by mentioning a couple of things about how we go about that kind of planning. We believe that the most crucial pieces of any crisis preparation are having the right people on the crisis team -- properly trained, experienced people, and a process that everyone understands that defines what the various roles are in dealing with the crisis situation. Then we get out of the way...
of the people and let them do their jobs. We use what we call a crisis pyramid and it's just real simple to explain. We classify crises into three tiers. A tier one crisis is one that we believe that the people on the ground have the capability of handling in terms of they're trained, they've got all the materials they need, they have all the resources they need. In that situation, we have virtually no role at all. It's handled locally. It's managed locally. A good example of this would be a fire in a refinery, a ship that has a small breech in compartments and is not dumping a lot of product out. By the way, we use this same approach, not only for security crises but every crisis in the corporation is handled using the same model, with local people as the basic core for dealing with it and then we add resources as we need depending on the nature of the crisis.

A tier-two crisis is a little bit more serious. A good example of this -- we had an oil spill in Nigeria last year. About 40,000 barrels were dumped. It was outside the capability of Nigeria to handle it by itself. We had regional teams that could be immediately activated, regional teams mobilized to provide the support. We still did not have any headquarters involvement in terms of our HQ crisis capabilities in that situation.

A tier-three crisis -- this is all hell breaking loose. The last one of these we had in the corporation was in May of last year in Indonesia when we had to evacuate our entire employee and dependent populations out of Jakarta. That was beyond the capabilities of the company in Jakarta to deal with. Regionally they couldn't handle all of the issues so we had to go to the full-scale roll-out in which we opened up our crisis center in Fairfax Mobil HQ, our crisis center in Singapore, and the Jakarta office.

The BST is what we call our Business Support Team. It's the high level team and I'm one of the senior managers on it. This team's role emerges when we go into a crisis at tier three and sometimes at tier two. We're there to provide whatever support is needed by the people on the ground. We're not there to second guess. We're not there as decision makers. We're not there to shoot constant questions out to them -- have you done this, have you done that? We assume they are doing all the things that need to be done. Our job is to be available to provide whatever support they need in terms of people, resources, money, to deal with the crisis.

And right up here at the top is what we call the EO, the executive office -- the chairman and the president of the corporation. The main job here is to keep them out of it. I said this to the chairman and he understands our philosophy. Our job is to minimize his role to the absolute smallest amount possible, and the way you do it is by communication, letting him know what's going on, that everything's being taken care of so he's comfortable with what's happening. As I mentioned yesterday, if that doesn't occur, it creates a vacuum. There's a large sucking sound and this guy's right down here somewhere trying to decide how many trucks we need at the scene because they're all guys that have been operational people too.

Anyway, that's how we handle situations. That's our philosophy behind crisis, and it took us a long time to get there. We went through a process of going through checklists and we looked at crises and we said "what are all the things that would need to be done in a crisis situation in Mobil Corporation?" We had thousands of items that we sorted out as: handled at headquarters, handled regionally, handled on the ground. The first time we went through the checklist 92% of the items were to be handled at headquarters. Today it's somewhere around 10%. It's moving towards about 5%. It's taken us a long time to get there and lots of battles and each one was examined as to whether it has to be handled at headquarters. Why can't it be handled in the field? Until we now have a template that we operate on, and when the Fairfax crisis center is activated, the only thing these guys have in front of them is the list of the 8% or 9% that they're responsible for saying we need to make sure that this happens. Everything else is off in another book being handled by other people.

I mentioned books by the way. One of the reasons we came to this understanding is we reviewed all the crisis planners around the world about seven or eight years ago and we found an
interesting phenomenon. They were all in notebooks, and when you open the book, usually right in front there were one or two legal pages, all handwritten. That was the crisis plan. That was what you needed for the crisis. You could tell that the official pages hadn't even been opened and these places were going through crises all the time and those two pages said basically who are the experts, what were the telephone numbers, what buttons do I push to get the help I need to handle the crisis. And we began to realize that's the reality. The reality is the right people with the right training and experience and a general process that keeps the right people focused on the right things is all you really need to effectively manage a crisis, and that takes a certain amount of trust in the people that you've got in the organization to do the job. We constantly practice this process.

We do scenario planning. We're constantly working the system and trying to improve it, but at base, it comes down to good people with good training and a process that everybody understands, and then trusting your people to do the job.

The seven fatalities in 1997 of U.S. citizens in international situations: One was a geologist in Colombia who was kidnapped and killed. That is a classic example of threat that is known, that's specific. It can be dealt with. It wasn't, in this case, handled properly, but it was focused and it focused on him because he was an economic target, because having been kidnapped he translated into money for the group that kidnapped so he was targeted because he was a business person.

There were two people that were killed incidentally in bombings in Jerusalem, who were private citizens. Wrong place, wrong time kind of situation. They weren't targeted because they were Americans. They weren't targeted because of anything. They just happened to be in the wrong place.

And then there were the four Union Texas employees who were assassinated in Karachi. They were targeted because they were Americans. They were targeted because they were probably business people in a soft target. Maybe an example of displacement, I'm not sure. From my standpoint we knew there were risks in Karachi. We knew there were risks to our people in Karachi. We took security measures to protect them over and above what we would normally do in Karachi. I've analyzed the Union Texas situation. They knew it was high risk. They made some judgments as to what steps they needed to take to protect their people. In my professional judgment, they didn't make the right calls, but that's easy to say as a Monday-morning quarterback.

They did not have a security-trained driver driving that vehicle. Their driver froze up. It was a holiday, with very little traffic. A car stopped in front of them, the driver thought he had clear lanes on both sides. His car was bigger, he could have rammed the car out of the way. If he had been a trained security driver those people would be alive. We didn't have any of our people traveling without trained drivers. They were using a vehicle that was very much out of place in Karachi. It was a big black station wagon. It drew attention. It was the normal kind of vehicle. There are lots of things that they did that in retrospect they probably should not have done, but it wasn't that they misunderstood the environment. They understood the risk. Everybody understood the risk.
2. Threat to Citizens Overseas
Mr. Kevin Herbert

We have been focusing on the danger to American embassies abroad and to the corporate world. My office, the Office of Overseas Citizen Services, deals with Americans abroad who may be there in a corporate role but probably aren't. We have about 3.1 million Americans residing abroad. We issue about six million passports a year. There are lots of people, lots of Americans traveling all over the world. We live in an age of ecotourism and profound wealth. People have time, they have money to go anywhere in the world. We're such a diverse multicultural society we have many American citizens and the majority of American citizens living abroad in the country they originally. They lived in the United States for a period of time, became a citizen and went back there to live; but, of course, they are still American citizens equal to anyone in the room.

We do two things that relate to terrorism. One is we keep these people informed to the extent we can about the threat that may exist to them. It may not be a terrorist threat. In fact, most of the time it's not. We have a public announcement out on Cameroon at the moment because of the volcanic eruption. We have one on Malaysia because of a viral infection that's in pigs that's killed quite a number of people. The majority of them are not terrorist related but some of them are. We have travel warnings on about 25 countries at the moment, countries in which we think it is too dangerous for Americans to go there. Colombia is one of those. Most of them are countries you would recognize quickly, such as Albania, Rwanda, Burundi. There's a whole series of countries where it is very dangerous for an American to go. We put out the information and say this is a very dangerous place for you to go. Those are our travel warnings. Our public announcements are more specific--a volcanic eruption, viral pig disease.

We also have a consular information sheet that exists on every country in the world. This is not where a good hotel is or where a good restaurant is. It's a page, two pages, three pages, that talk about crime in that country. This is specific to and of interest to Americans -- crime in that country, areas of instability, immigration procedures that they might need to know about. Health procedures specific to that country, address of the embassy or consulate that can provide some assistance. That's our basic document, that consular information sheet. As I said, there're public announcements and travel warnings on top of that. We do have a couple of world-wide ones like the one Mike Farmer doesn't like that tell people if you go some place you might run into a terrorist problem because there are certain people out there that don't like us. We don't know where it might be. We say Americans are not specifically targeted but be careful when you're out there. It doesn't say very much obviously but it fulfills our obligation to inform the traveling public that there are these concerns out there, but most people who travel or live abroad don't have the sophisticated knowledge of the topic as the people in this room. There're going abroad for this first time. They have an amazing naivete at some times about where they're going and what they can do and the dangers that exist for them, so we have that obligation. We also have an obligation -- and there is no double standard policy -- to share any information with the private American citizen community that we are share in the official American community. You cannot put a sign on the bulletin board in any embassy that says don't go to this province because of this activity and not share that with the public. That really came about as a result of the Pan Am 103 crash. In the aftermath of that they realized that they had put up a notice in the embassy in Moscow based on some information and that information was not shared with the American public.

On the other side of the house in this Bureau of Consular Affairs where I work, we do visas, and there's a component of the anti-terrorism issue there because we don't want terrorists to enter the United States. The Blind Sheik entered the United States legally with a visa which a consular office or a person acting in a consular capacity issued to him. Since that time, a great deal of systems improvement has gone on inside the State Department. I don't think that incident could happen again, at least not if the person applied in his own name and identity. Unfortunately,
lots of people enter the United States every day either illegally crossing a border without any inspection or entering at a port of entry with a document in another name or identity.

We have a program now where four times a year in every embassy in the world they sit down and go over with all the components of that embassy that have any intelligence information, any likely suspect or anybody who might be active in that country who should be entered into the visa lookout system. Frankly, a lot of people who weren't in the system have since been entered into the system, and a number of those people have applied for visas and been denied visas. It's obviously not a foolproof system but it limits the ability of people to enter the United States.

We have also have Y2K public announcement out there. We've issued one. We will issue more. We expect a serious disruption in certain countries to a traveling or resident American population because of the Y2K bug. It's not necessarily related to terrorism although some people sometime assume that terrorists may take advantage of that point in time. I don't know if that's the case or not, but we do have a Y2K public announcement out there, and we will have more, and we will have a section in every one of out consular information sheets relating to Y2K by October 1, 1999.

To a certain extent it will be specific to each country. It may refer to other web sites that have more specific information. FAA is doing an analysis of airline safety in the world. CIA is doing a lot of analysis. They will have their own web site on the subject, but there'll be a whole variety of web sites that we will link to to get information. Each country's producing their own web site, I think, on Y2K although credibility in some of those things will no doubt be in question.

I've talked about Americans abroad and I mentioned 3.1 million. It's not like they're all living in Paris or Rome either. Serbia - Montenegro has about 4,400 American citizens living there. That was of concern to us when we began the bombing campaign. Columbia which we have a travel warning on, we have about 27,000 Americans citizens in living Columbia. Philippines which has insurrection in the south, the New People's Army, Abu Sayyaf, the World Liberation Army, etc. We've got over 100,000 Americans living in the Philippines, so whenever there's a problem some place in the world we've got Americans involved in it and it's our office's responsibility to keep them informed and to help them, if they get arrested, if they die, all of those things that happen to Americans abroad. We have 6,000 Americans die abroad each year. The majority of those people are resident in the country in which they die. About 1,500 of those people, their remains are brought back to the United States. That's something that our office and our consular offices abroad deal with. We have about 6,000 Americans arrested a year abroad or detained. About 3,000 of those are probably formal arrests and then we have about 1,500 Americans in prison. It's our responsibility to visit them and keep their families informed. Some of those are high profile like Lori Berenson in Peru who is a victim of revolutionary activities and serving time in a prison in Peru. Our office deals with all of these kinds of problems, all these things involving American citizens. Terrorism is a part of it. It's a concern for people traveling abroad, living abroad. We try to keep them informed and, of course, lots of people in this room provide the information that we share. That's what we do basically.
3. Levels of Terrorism
Mr. Alan Pino

I'm going to give you an overview of patterns in international terrorism, looking back over the last decade very briefly to give a sense of numbers and so on, focusing most of my remarks on what we in the U.S. government and the CIA are dealing with now and consider the greatest terrorist problems right now around the world. I also have a few comments at the end about terrorist issues that have become of increasing importance in the last few years and that we are increasingly devoting more resources to -- such as chemical and biological terrorism.

First, just to give you a sense of the various topics I'm going to try to brush over very quickly. The U.S., as you all know, has been a focus of much of the terrorism over the last decade; in fact the last three decades, international terrorism, if you look for trends and overall numbers of attacks, one thing we see is that in the '80s we saw an average of about 600 attacks annually and in the '90s it's been closer to 400 attacks annually.

In the last few years, we've seen it drop off even from that. That's the good news and I think there are a number of reasons for that. One is that counterterrorism efforts by the United States and by governments worldwide, both individually and in cooperation, and I emphasize the latter, particularly the cooperative aspect of the work against international terrorism, that has increased tremendously and become much more effective, so a number of the groups that were active in the '80s were destroyed or driven out of existence. Some of them died out because their ideologies no longer were attractive with the collapse of the Soviet Union, but the Red Brigade is the Baader Meinhoff gang now. Many of the leftist groups, although some of these are still around and very active still. You have the dying out of some groups. You had a much more effective counterterrorism strategy by a range of governments around the world. Those have helped to lower those numbers. That's the good news. The bad news is that the total casualties have actually increased overall through the 1990s.

We had Kobar Towers and a number of other less high profile incidents around the world in '96 and of course in 1998 we had the African embassy bombings which drove the numbers up one again, but to give you a sense about what this has meant is that we have a much higher overall casualties per incident in the late '90s than we did in the late '80s, and one reason for that is even though the number of terrorist groups have gone out of existence, of course others have sprung up. Terrorist groups are becoming more sophisticated and what they do and the kind of explosives they use and how they carry out the terrorist attacks and are going more for larger impact with their attacks than they did 10 years ago.

I mentioned the pattern of going more after civilian targets than in the past. If you look at these statistics for '92 to '98, you can see that businesses and others which includes civilians have dominated the attacks and one principal reason for this is that the number of terrorist groups around the world have realized that. Well, there are a couple of reasons. One is that the official facilities have become less secure. The African bombing showing that we have a long way to go there, but it's going to be a very daunting task to try to protect every single U.S. embassy fully from attack, but many terrorist groups in addition have realized that by going after softer targets they can have a dramatic impact on the government, the security of the population, on the economy of a country, on the perception that the government can provide protection for the people and we've seen this and some of the most notable cases have been Algeria where the violence still goes on; Egypt, where beginning in the early '90s we had a resurgence of Islamic terrorism from the Egyptian al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. We've seen it in the Philippines. We've seen it in a number of places around the world. Columbia, South America is another example of where civilians are targeted as a way of destabilizing government.

I mention that there's been an anti-U.S. focus to a good percentage of the attacks and it has
varied from about 20% to 40% per year of all the attacks internationally that we document. The international terrorist attacks are directed against U.S. targets.

I don't have to highlight for this audience the reason why the U.S. has been such a focus for many terrorist groups. The fact that we're the one remaining superpower is a factor. Our support for Israel has been a major factor in drawing terrorist ire toward us. The fact we have been so aggressive in counterterrorist activity has been a factor as well. We've brought quite a number of terrorists back to the United States for trial and they've been convicted and that has brought the retaliation and threats of more retaliation. The fact that we're seen as playing a role in so many policy issues around the world that negatively effect terrorist groups.

In the Middle East our support for Israel was seen as helping to maintain Israeli domination over Palestinians. Our support for Saudi Arabia is seen as helping that government remain in power. The Al Saud monarchy is seen by the Islamic extremist organizations as, ironically, insufficiently Islamic and as basically corrupt in its practice and support of Islam. A number of the other governments in the region are also seen that way in their eyes, in that we support such ones as the Egyptian government.

When we look at the groups that today that the U.S. government considers the greatest threat to U.S. interests, the Islamic extremist organizations dominate. We have a tier structure in the U.S. government for determining where we're going to allocate resources to. They are tier one, tier two, tier three, and tier four, and when you get down to tier four and there may be 80 or 100 groups that have done terrorism at one time or another, but they're not currently a problem for the United States although we don't want to ignore them completely. In tier one are groups that have conducted attacks against us recently or have a history of hostility to the United States.

The Islamic extremist organizations today really fall into roughly three categories. You have your traditional groups like the Lebanese Hizballah which was a major conducting attacks against the United States in the 1980s -- the Marine barracks, the TWA 47, the embassy bombings, kidnapping, hostage takings of dozens of Americans, and the groups such as Hamas which has never attacked the U.S. but is trying to destroy a major U.S. policy interest which is the advance of the Arab-Israeli peace process and bringing that to a successful conclusion.

The Gama'at refers to the Egyptian Gama'at, the Blind Sheik, the Sheik Abudul Rahman, their the spiritual leader is in prison in New York for life and they have threatened retaliation against us for that and because of our support of the Egyptian government.

We actually have a tier zero and Osama Bin Ladin's organization is in there. He's in tier zero because of the obvious threat that his organization poses to the U.S. As you know, he has been indicted for being the mastermind of the Africa bombings. There's a $5 million dollar reward for his capture and what makes his organization particularly dangerous is that he has developed really an umbrella for a variety of groups who now work together at least in some of their goals. Under his umbrella you'll find Algerian groups and Egyptian groups. You'll find Saudi groups. He is a Saudi himself. You'll find Afghan extremist organizations and even a loose affiliation--Bangdaleshi organizations, Pakistani, and groups from as far away as the Philippines have come to Afghanistan to train at Bin Laden's camps so it's a very wide net. He has a presence in quite a number of countries, either the affiliates have quite a presence that we think is a threatening and dangerous presence in a number of countries around the world, so they really have a world-wide reach.

The last type of spin-off of these networks of Islamic extremist organizations is the sort of ad hoc terrorist organization represented by Musta Yusef when he did the World Trade Center bombing, when he attempted to carry out the bombings of airliners out of Manila, a plot that spoiled in '95. He assembled the group to do that ad hoc at the time. He threatened to pull
together a group of supporters, taught them what he wanted them to do and used them to carry out the attack. This kind of terrorist group obviously is extremely difficult to track and it's also difficult to deter. There's no state-sponsor to provide any restraint. There's no popular opinion that the group is trying to appeal to. Yusef's goal was simply to cause mass casualties and to inflict pain.

I've touched on a couple of these points already. I've mentioned the great growing sophistication we've seen in the modus operandi of many of these groups, in all the aspects of how they carry out a terrorist attack, and some of it has to do with the fact that they set up logistical networks that really extend worldwide. They can move men and materiel and money very successfully to different places around the world and it gives them the ability to conduct an attack in Africa or in East Asia or in Europe and it makes it a much more difficult problem to deal with than when you're focusing on Lebanese Hizballah only in Lebanon.

Just as an example of some of the worldwide reach we've seen. In the early '90s Lebanese Hizballah doing a major attack, behind the major attack against the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina. We think they were also responsible for the bombing of the building, again in Buenos Aires in '94, which killed over 100 people and again, that was a retaliation we believe for an Israeli attack against Hizballah in Lebanon two or three months prior to that. There's a very large Lebanese Shite community in the tri-border region of Latin America where Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil come together that Lebanese Hizballah has tapped into and we think that there's a very high terrorist potential obviously demonstrated here in their ability to reach out to cells that they were able to cultivate in the tri-border area of Latin America and it still exists there today. Yusef reaching around the world to U.S. and East Asia to plan attacks and, of course, Bin Laden I mentioned the extent of his organization.

We see Bin Laden's presence I think in something over 40 countries around the world today and it obviously gives him the ability to reach out far beyond the Middle East even through his primary state goal is to remove the U.S. presence from the Arabian peninsula which he see as a tarnishing and a threat to Islam. That if we are in the proximity to Islamic holy places and that we are helping to prop up a regime in the Saudi government, the Saudi regime, which he sees as illegitimate and insufficiently Islamic, so even though that's his main focus, I think he would dearly love to conduct a terrorist attack on the U.S. presence here. He's able to reach out elsewhere with his international organization.

If you look at the regions of concern, you'll note quickly again that in just about every region that I highlight that the Islamic piece pops up from Africa where we have a quite a number of extremist organizations that are growing more active and many of them have featured anti-U.S. rhetoric as part of their ideology and many of these indigenous groups in Africa for example, have links to foreign Islamic groups outside. Osama Bin Laden, of course, we allege, we believe that Bin Laden was involved in the Africa bombings and we've been able to document that his network has fairly extensive contacts with Islamic extremist organizations in Africa and we see the Islamic theme throughout the world.

Professor Sapp mentioned earlier that state sponsors have not been as active as they once were and I'd say that really the '80s and early '90s were more the period of the state sponsors and, since about '91 or '92, international terrorism has been dominated by Islamic extremist organizations -- although certainly there are other groups there doing terrorism as well. That's my focus today.

Of the state sponsors of terrorism, I'm just using here the ones in the Middle East. The State Department's list has seven countries which includes Cuba and North Korea in addition to these five. Iran has been the main concern to the U.S. during much of the '90s and what we're watching very carefully now is to see whether there's going to be any real change in Iranian policy with the election almost two years ago now of a new president Khatami who represents a more moderate
voice and has spoken out against terrorism and has moderated Iranian policy in a number of areas, but he was facing very stiff opposition with conservatives in Iran including the supreme leader of Iran, Kheirani, who do not want to improve relations with the west or the U.S. and many of whom see terrorism as a legitimate part of their foreign policy.

And finally, some of the new challenges we’re dealing with. I’ve already mentioned the idea of the terrorists broadening the venues for their attacks and focusing a lot more on civilian targets during the ’90s, but the CBRN, the chemical-biological-radiological threat and the information systems terrorism are two of the issues that we’ve been focusing increasingly over the last four or five years and as far as the chemical-biological goes, we’ve been able to document that something around 12 to 15 terrorism groups have shown an interest in or sought to acquire or actually used for the most part on the small scale some form of primarily chemical agent to conduct an attack. Most of the attacks we’ve seen have been such things as poisoning of individuals or trying to poison water systems and so on.

The sarun attack by the Aum Shinriko in ’95 was really a wake-up call for the U.S. government as to the horrific potential of this, the fact that there might be many more groups out there that were trying to acquire this kind of capability. As I’ve said, since that time we’ve documented about 12 groups have really shown an interest or are trying to acquire a capability. Thus far though, the actual use or any attempt to use these, surprisingly in my mind, the attempt to use these weapons has been limited and I think there’s still a sense that there’s still a fear of unconventional weapons, chemical biological weapons among terrorists. As they learn more about them, as they get more expert that fear will dissipate. I think they’re still able to have significant success with traditional explosives which they’re familiar with and good at and that, I think, why change. If you’ve got a good weapon and you get into something that could be problematic. The problem for many terrorist groups is the backlash, that if you kill your own people or the population you’re trying to reach out in case of an insurgent group, you obviously alienate them. We’ve seen in the Africa bombings criticism being directed against Bin Laden by those who of believe he may have been involved because so many innocents were killed.

I would say that the groups that we worry most about for possible chemical attack would be those such as Osama Bin Ladin’s organization or someone like Yusef who seem to have no fear of what the public backlash would be and whose goal is to use whatever cost to inflict mass casualties on their enemy, in this case the United States.
Part III. American Institutions and Public Responses

1. Terrorism and the American Media
   Dr. D. Timothy White

I'm going to put on a hat for a couple of moments here that I have worn often professionally. I may not agree myself with everything that I'm going to say to you and you may not agree with any of it, but it is the hat of a television producer -- specifically a news producer -- operating when there are significant events going on in the world. I will try to look at the crisis through that particular lens. Take the situation where you have a sailor out on the Theodore Roosevelt launching F-14 Tomcats last Sunday and you've got a relief worker in Macedonia dealing with Albanian refugees coming across with cold, starved babies in their arms, staying up 22 hours a day trying to feed these people. A Serbian teacher in Belgrade, a Pentagon planner back in Washington. They're all doing the same thing. They're all watching CNN or MSNBC or Fox or one of the news cycles that have become the natural trough where worldwide everyone sort of cozies up to when there's a big event. The word terrorist is thrown around a great deal -- but who is the terrorist? Well, for each of those people it's someone else. Is the terrorist the Serb militiaman coming down to Kosovo? Is it the Kosovar? Is the terrorist the KLA somewhere outside of Pristina? Is the terrorist the NATO pilot flying the planes? It depends on where you sit and as we in this room have already agreed, there are about 144 different definitions of the word and we haven't really come up with a very good one yet, but it's a term that is being thrown about broadly and with great passion by people on all sides of any given issue.

Terrorism, it seems to me, at its very heart is a symbolic act. Now, we've talked about how effective this bomb is or that bomb is and a couple of hundred here and the body count is up and so forth, but we're not talking about very many people. If these folks were out to kill large numbers of Americans or anyone else, they could probably do more with a missile during rush hour than they've done with many of these bombs. If it's a symbolic act, a terrorist act is a symbolic act, no matter what its motivation, its intention is to get attention. Without attention, a terrorist act is a tree falling in the forest with no one to hear and it's pointless. In today's world, that attention increasingly comes from television, from the need to have pictures shown again and again of their handiwork. Why is that?

Well, in the journalism business, who, what, where, when and why are the five building blocks of what you do. That's how you tell the story -- who, what, where, when and why. But in almost all stories, you can get the who, what, where, and when out of the way pretty quickly. The depth of the bomb crater and how many were killed and what's the name of the ambassador and what's the name of the CEO of the company that owns the pipeline, and so on and so forth.

The why, on the other hand, is what really fascinates journalists. That's what really gets their blood going, and the why is important to journalists for a number of reasons. One, you now have a 24-hour news cycle. It used to be that Walter Cronkite sat there and gave the whole world the news at 6:30 one night and everybody gathered around the television set to watch. It's not that way any more. We have 24-hour news cycles. We have nameless relatively low paid anchors yammering on and on and on and on, trying to advance the story. Something new has to be reported. If you're any good, you'll get something new. That's how you make your reputation in the business. You get something new. The why is the area in which reporters can use sometimes unattributed sources, speculation, rumor, and forward the story and therefore look good to their editors. You will hear on CNN and everywhere else "CNN has just learned that our reporter Jan Smith has just learned so and so." It makes them look good to their bosses and, just like Mobil Oil, they're in the business of making money. Looking good to their bosses means their bosses think more people are watching The more people watching, the more they can charge for their advertising and everyone is happy, so you have to advance the story. So you're playing into the hands of people who need this kind of attention for a symbolic act and we're not really quite sure what a terrorist act is.
Certainly the Aum Shinrikyo case, and an embassy bombing, fit the definition. How about blowing up the Golden Gate Bridge when nobody's on it? I suppose. How about the front page picture of last Sunday in the Washington Post, a picture of a kid throwing rocks through the window of McDonald's in Belgrade. Is that a terrorist act? No, that was vandalism. What if he blew up the building? No, probably still vandalism. What if 10 people got together to blow up the building? Oh, that's another thing.

Frequency and the numbers of people involved are as important as the intention. That one kid throwing the rock probably felt that he was politically motivated. He may have gone home and told his parents he's now a terrorist. It's an elastic term with an elastic meaning and the media is playing on that elasticity to keep people pumped up and interested all the time.

There's another interesting phenomenon here. Just as a criminal will often return to the scene of a crime, a terrorist will keep watching CNN to make sure that the object of his terrorism is being shown. That's how he can help measure his success. We know that Bin Laden's people watch television and they watch not only the reports of what they did, but what comes afterward. What are the reactions that are coming? What does law enforcement say? What's known and what's not known at this point? And something even more important -- what's the analysis? How much "bounce" is the terrorist getting out of his actions because television will also seek having abandoned the idea of ever being objective. Television seeks to be balanced. That means if there's an explosion in Dar es Salaam and we have to find out the why, we're going to go find out someone who says this was an isolated incident. We're going to find someone who says this is the first cusp of a massive wave of these kinds of bombings. If you have any belief in between those things you probably won't get on the air because these 25- and 26-year old producers are going to be working the phones with the usual suspects to find people who will have opposing views -- what happens?

World opinion is now framed as good guys/ bad guys, yes/no, in polar opposites, when in fact the truth may be far more complex and infinitely more complicated. What that means, I think, for a group like this is that it's important to help define what is known and what is not known. It is important to correct the record. It's important for law enforcement to say what they know to the extent they can do so without compromising the safety of others because speculation runs absolutely rank. So does absolute ignorance posturing as authority on television. We see this time and time again. Consider the military authorities discussing what's going on in Kosovo right now. Many of these so-called experts haven't read a book or been in the field for 30 years and they're totally out of touch.

There's a civilian analyst from the Center for Strategic and International Studies who was discussing the application of air power recently during a bombing. He was simply wrong. The man doesn't know what he's talking about, but there he is because he's available to the 26-year-old producer. So assuming that the terrorist who needs to have the visibility is looking at the aftermath of an event to see what is being discussed, what is being warned about, this is very important to the kinds of sensible minds that come from your organizations and that sit around this table to take it on. It is both a personal and an organizational responsibility to correct the record when things are wrong, to make yourselves available and proactively make yourselves available to the media if you have something to add that's not there.

But that's a very important thing. We invented a term yesterday -- "orchestrated ambiguity." Why would a terrorist not claim credit for what they've done or make clear the goals of their terrorist act? That's because the very environment that we were just discussing of speculation that flows from this 24-hour news cycle, this environment of speculation tends to amplify their means and their ends. Suddenly they can appear to be an international conspiracy if they don't make known that they're not. If they don't specify who they are and what their goals are, speculation begins to run rampant on them. This is another area in which people who know better could speak up and help define what is known and what is not known.
The antidote for this innate search for why and this speculative sense of why by these posturing fools on TV is that law enforcement has to be willing to frame the answers in a manner that does not exacerbate the situation, that intends to reign it in. Wherever possible this needs to be people on the scene, investigators on the scene. Investigators on the scene should be aware of who the credible and reliable sources are that they can refer these reporters to because there are thoughtful people. If you've got a big hostage situation, and you're the bureau of local law enforcement, I don't think it's irresponsible or unprofessional to call Frank Ochberg. There are more formal ways to do this, but the concept is that it's in the interest of the good guys to get out there everything that we know in a proactive and positive way, in a way that calms down this hyperventilating fear and madness, the anxiety that comes out of seeing the big explosion whether it's in Olympic Park or whether it's in Dar es Salaam or whether it's in Nairobi.

What role can the media play in anticipating and ameliorating future terrorist attacks? The media won't play any role at all. They would love to have the first camera at Armageddon. They're not going to help, but they can provide a conduit through which more responsible voices can inform the less responsible voices or at least counter the less responsible voices.

2. Historical Millennial Lessons
Professor Richard Landes

At some point somebody said something about random actions that defy analysis. Did I get that right? We have also heard that in order to understand some of these groups, particularly the really weird groups, the apocalyptic and millennial groups, we have to empathize with them because their logic is illogic. They have a logic but it's not a logic. How predictable is it? It's a question. I would like to emphasize the point that Tim White made which is that in my psychological analysis the origins of millennial groups, the main psychological motivation is what I called ADD Type 2. We all know about ADD Type 1. It's the inability to pay enough attention, attention deficient disorder. You can't pay attention. ADD Type 2 I define as the inability to get enough attention, so that essentially what you're dealing with is people who feel that they do not have the stage that they deserve.

One of the great attractions of an apocalyptic belief is that it says that now is the moment where the great cosmic battle between good and evil is played out and of course, the believer is on the side of the good. You are finally center stage and one of the characteristics of millennial groups is that for the most part they rest at the margins of a culture and they are quiescent. Then I use the term apocalyptic to describe groups that get activated because they believe that "now is the time." Timing becomes a crucial element of whether a millennial group is quiescent or whether it is active. I would argue that although not all apocalyptic groups are terrorist, certainly, unless proven otherwise, it may be a good line of inquiry to ask whether any terrorist group is apocalyptic because one of the major motivations for apocalyptic terror is precisely this belief. It's not Machiavellian. The ends justify the means not just because you want power but because you must do this. These are the final days of mankind and one of the basic elements of most apocalyptic scenarios is that before the millennial kingdom can come, before the kingdom of justice and peace -- whether it's defined religiously by Christians, Muslims, Jews, Buddhists, you name it, or secularly by Nazis or Communists or whatever which are classic millennial groups -- before that happens, there has to be some kind of major catastrophe in which literally there's megadeath. I recommend you read the book of Revelation to have a sense of the scale of destruction that precedes the coming of the right kind of society.

Now, in terms of ADD Type 2 and terrorism, there's a famous story that Jacob Burkhart tells about the Renaissance in his chapter describing individualism as one of the great dimensions. He describes the Italian noble who had a visit on the same day by the pope and the emperor. He took them up his tower and they were surveying his estate and he thought to himself if I pushed the emperor and the pope off of the tower, I will be the only man in history to have killed a pope and an emperor in one day. Now, he didn't do it, but the point is that to some extent, it would be
what I would call “non-apocalyptic but attention desiring forms of terrorism.” I think though that the emperor and the pope are two people and they're selected obviously because of their importance. Only in the cases where they go after large numbers of civilians, are you dealing with apocalyptic groups.

Now, to reinforce another point that Michael Barkun made regarding things to anticipate in the future. The real danger in millennial movements is not what happens when they expect God to intervene on their side. It's what happens after they're disappointed. It's very easy to be generous when you believe that the omnipotent God is about to intervene and take your side in history. It's when you're disappointed, when among other things you've openly expressed your belief in this and then you're humiliated by the failure, that at least some portion of these groups will go toxic. If we look at the year 2000, first of all I don't think it's just one date. It's not January 1st although Y2K has given that considerable prominence. There's a whole series of dates. There's the Easter/Passover period. There's Pentecost and then, of course, there's the High Holidays. One of the striking things about Christian pre-millennialists, almost every rapture prediction of the last decade has been based on the Jewish High Holidays coming at that point, so by the end of 2000, we'll see in the October period this and then we'll have a rollover to 2001 and as Michael said, there're a whole series of dates. The New Agers are looking at 2012. The Christians have 2007 as a date and then they'll be looking at 2033. There're a whole series of dates and I think one of the points that Michael made and that I would emphasize is that millennialism is not date-dependent.

You can have millennialism without a date. I consider the '60s a millennial moment. As far as I know, there's no date associated with it. It's this vague notion of the Age of Aquarius but as we know that should be 2006, so that's not the issue. The issue is that a date like 2000 will intensify millennialism. It's not that it's dependent on it and it will easily survive it and, I would argue, will get more serious subsequently.

Another point I'd like to make in terms of anticipating the future - we've talked about the possibility of new forms of terrorism and one of these is information warfare. I think Y2K will be one of those hinge marks in terms of information warfare. I think Y2K represents a moment of vulnerability that has not been given the necessary attention. I know at CSIS they've talked about this, but I think it represents not only a moment of vulnerability on January 1st, but in terms of global impact. This has very serious potential in the long run, and in particular, it represents a moment of vulnerability in what we just heard about in terms of the difference between democratic and authoritarian societies. I would like to recommend the book by Eli Sayeg, called The Honey and the Hemlock. It is a study of democratic tendencies in Greece. He argues that in order for democracy to emerge, you have to overcome what he calls the paranoid imperative. The paranoid imperative says essentially "either you rule someone else or they rule you." You're either a master or you're a slave. Those are your two choices in life and, historically speaking, not to get depressing about this, most governments are based on paranoid imperative. Most governments view their own populations in these terms which is why really until we get a democratic society, we're not talking about citizens, we're talking about subjects, and therefore they consider the subject population as expendable in any case where you have serious problems.

Historically speaking, millennial movements which tend to be popular are throttled at the start. I don't know if you're aware of this but when the Intifada started in the West Bank, it actually spread to a number of Arab countries. They immediate got out the machine guns and that was the end of it. That was Henry Kissinger's advice to the Israelis -- close off the West Bank, get the reporters out of there, go in and shoot up 100 – 200 people and that will be the end of it. Now, that is, if you will, what Machiavelli would call the economy of violence. If you had shot up 200 people at the start, it would've been the end of it and you wouldn't have had it drag on for 10 years and have more than 200 people die.
On the other hand, it is based on this principle of rule or be ruled, and I think that one of the ways to understand the difference between civil society and authoritarian society is precisely the overcoming of this. If you look at the rhetoric that exists amongst terrorists - it is exactly this approach of rule or be ruled. Terrorism is an expression, again, of this kind of a mentality if you look at the conspiracy language that comes out. America is major producer of this language. If you look at the American scene, conspiracy language is steeped in the paranoid imperative. "These people are out to enslave us." "That's what FEMA is out there to do." "Everything, all of civil society, is just a cover to enslave mankind." "This is found in the protocols of the Elders of Zion." We see in the Nazis this kind of warrant for genocide against the Jews who they claimed were planning something like this. One of the things that we know about these groups is that they're essentially projecting their own desires. The very moment that the Nazis are screaming about the Jews planning to enslave mankind, they had their own plans to enslave mankind, so, in a sense, it seems to me that when we deal with these things, the culture that underlies these attitudes has to be examined. Much of the anti-modern language that terrorists use and that millennialists use is in fact the reflection of a fear of the erosion of the culture, of rule or be ruled, of the paranoid imperative which bring us to the point that was made earlier.

The point about trust is related also to the issue of public opinion. Just to invoke for one moment as an historian Y1K, there was in France at the turn of the first millennium a movement called the Peace of God. In its strongest component it was a popular movement. It was supported by the church, supported by the aristocracy. Its most powerful weapon was public opinion. It gathered large numbers of people in open fields and forced the aristocracy to take what we would call the non-terrorist votes, in other words, the aristocracy, the knights, and the people who had the castles and who were essentially kind of Mafioso aristocracy were forced to take an oath that protected noncombatants from violence. I would argue this marks the origin of civil society in the west.

The point that I want to make is that public opinion is terribly important in all of these issues and, it seems to me, there's an education process going on. The media is the best protection that public opinion has. It can also corrupt public opinion. I would second what Tim White said, that it's very important to get out to the media and speak to media and not say "oh, they're going to do whatever they want no matter what I say."

One of the pictures from the embassy bombing yesterday that struck me was at the Dar es Salaam building. There were a couple of panels that had fallen over and it looked like the domino theory but it had stopped. I think that to the extent that there's public trust, it drains these groups of their ability to make an initial incident have a domino effect, and produce a really big incident. The way the media's set up, they're there to give reverberation to a terrorist incident. I think it's possible to change that dynamic so that in fact terrorists get more and more isolated and more and more rejected by populations, rather than glamorized.

3. **Democracy, Conflict and Terrorism**  
**Professor John Norton Moore**

Let me first congratulate you and the leaders of this group that set this conference up. I think it really is an extraordinary achievement and something that can make a great difference. As I look around the room and see the expertise here, it really is wonderful. I am not going to deliver my usual terrorism speech today because of that expertise. I think it would be little bit like being the chairman of the United States Olympic javelin team and electing to receive. Rather than do that, I'm going to share with you some of the broader implications and empirical correlations of some of the work that I have been doing in relation to war and peace and to speculate a little bit and to ask some questions about the extent to which it may be relevant to the problem of terrorism generally.
Just to give you a little background on that. I had the great fun some years ago of being asked to go in as the first chairman when President Ford set up what was then a brand new agency, the United States Institute of Peace which shamelessly invoked the name of the National Institute of Health. Our real mandate, instead of speculating about things, was empirically and scientifically, to the extent possible, to find out what was the state of knowledge about where wars came from, what did humankind really today know about where wars came from and what might be successful strategies in trying to stop those wars. I had the great fun of running this institution for the first five years in which we tried to hear from the best people literally from the entire world in trying to answer that question and to look at what kinds of empirical correlations there might be out there. There was only one thing out there that was enormously robust, that would survive any kind of statistical analysis that was off the scale in its significance in relation to anything else out there, and that turned out to be the question of government structures.

It is something that is popularly being called today the democratic peace, and the principle concept is that democracies rarely if at all wage major war against democracies. There's a little bit of definition in that because first, what is a democracy and second, what is a major war, but statistically we use a 1,000 casualty cutoff which is obviously well above most terrorist kind of incidents. We're looking at the larger end of the scale and in that setting democracies from 1816 until the present, depending on what you accept as a democracy, have waged somewhere between zero and five or six wars against each other when you're talking about two democracies. That compares with non-democracies versus non-democracies of well over 200; and for non-democracies versus democracies, it's in something like the 150 to 160 range. So absolutely off the scale in relation to something is going on with respect to government structures. That makes a great difference.

Now, obviously you're left however with a variety of very interesting questions. One, what is it in relation to democracy and the government structure that makes the difference, and secondly, it is obviously not the end of the story. It can't be that by itself because democracies are still in a large number of wars, so there's got to be more. It's a synergy. It's a variety of other kinds of things that are obviously also important and can we find what they are, but before going to that rest of the story which is a great deal of speculation to tell you about what those two answers may be, we then began to look at a number of other areas because the correlation was so startling in relation to government structures and war that we said maybe we ought to run that correlation in relation to a variety of other issues.

One issue was uncovered in a study we funded on the matter of governments killing their own people. The result is called "Death by Government" and it is one of the most important books about the nature of the world, I think, that's been published in the 20th century and there's very little understanding of it. What was discovered is that governments are the greatest killers of their populations, and again, the correlation here is off the scale.

Totalitarian regimes particularly have been slaughtering their people at a rate that is somewhere between equivalent to four times the totality of all war combatants casualties in the 20th century combined. The figure he believes is somewhere between 170 and 180 million people slaughtered by the governments. The events in Rwanda, the events in Kosovo, the events in Bosnia before that, the events in Cambodia. These are not things as we look at them each time and say, well, that's something that happened in the past. It will not be happening. Surely this doesn't occur any more in the modern world, but sadly, their numbers seem to be staggering. Now, no one is really sure of those numbers. There's a huge variation. I personally believe that he is at maximum not on the high end by more than factor of two. If that is true, we are talking about governments slaughtering their own people as in Kosovo at a rate that is twice the problem of totality of casualties in all major wars combined in the 20th century.

We then asked the question about the simple correlation. It's off the scale here, except now you don't even have the problem of democracies being engaged in a major war. Yes, you find a
little bit of democratic genocide. We can go back to the treatment of the American Indians and we
can throw in a few other things, but it turns out that it is something like one-half of one percent by
the most generous kinds of arguments about guilt of democracies and that usually means you
add up certain things like saying the democracies were responsible for the deaths of all those that
we sent over to Joseph Stalin at the end of World War II that we forcefully repatriated knowing
that he was going to kill them. And he did kill them, and perhaps the example is entirely justified
even though he's the one that did the killing, but in any event, it's a startling correlation. So then
we began to look at the question of economic development and 15 years ago we had this giant
debate between status models and free markets, etc.

Today, we have at least four separate empirical studies done by country, by levels of
economic freedom, by levels of political freedom, etc. and it is a staggeringly clear correlation the
same way. You start over here with totalitarianism. You go through various forms of
authoritarianism. You go through electoral democracy and you go over here to liberal democracy
which is really perfecting human freedom the most and that's the one that has the least of all this
kind of behavior in relation to it.

Let me just give you one of the statistics on the economics from one of the latest surveys that
was done by Freedom House that I've been working on the board. According to the Freedom
House survey, 27 countries with the highest level of economic freedom with only 17% of the world
population produced 81% of the world economic problem. Twenty countries with the lowest levels
of economic freedom with 36% of the population produced 5% of the combined product, so we
begin to look at this question in relation to environmental protection which nobody seemed -- How
could that make any sense. We know that environmental problems are negative externalities and
good examples of market failure, etc., so surely that'll have no correlation to government
structures. Wrong. It probably has the same correlation although no one is entirely sure.
Interesting, the first group to pick this up because it was the peace movement and the Peace
Institute's now been seeing a lot of this data was the Norwegian Peace Institute that did the first
empirical study in relation to correlation between government structures and protection of the
environment, and while it was a cautious result they concluded that the correlation was running
there as well.

Mostly we had in this area a series of case studies like the environmental disaster of the
former Soviet Union or comparison with East Germany with West Germany and if you follow the
environmental situation there, you know what an absolutely extraordinary difference it is. So the
correlation powerfully seems to be fitting the environment as well, and then we discover that there
is a scholar up at Harvard, kind of an unknown fellow who just won the Nobel Prize in economics
this year called Professor Sen and as far as I can tell, he wasn't into any of this work in other
areas, but what he had done is the correlation between government structures and famine and he
discovered that counter to our general impression that famine is a result of bad potato crops and
potato blight and all of these kinds of things and lack of rainfall, that preventing mass famine
proves to be actually a ridiculously easy issue for functioning governments to perform and in fact,
it is exactly the same non-democratic correlations. He believes there has never been a famine, a
mass major famine in the history of the world that was not in a setting of colonialism or in a
setting of non-democratic regime. Just look around the world today for example in relation to
some of those we talk about.

The press is filled with stories about somehow there's been a lack of rain in North Korea and
therefore because of that there's a major famine taking place in North Korea where as many as
two million people may have died in this government failed famine in North Korea, or we could
run it through Somalia before that or Sudan today being used as a political weapon or the
intentional famines that Stalin ran or the enormous failure in China under Mao in which millions of
people died, and many others and run it right through the system.
I ran some figures the other day in preparation for coming here. I thought it might be interesting to take the State Department terrorism list and look at a correlation of government structures and no surprise to you, I'm sure that every single one of the states on the State Department current terrorism list is in fact a totalitarian or highly autocratic regime: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria. This is not to suggest that there are democratic governments that may not at a small scale be engaged in particular instances for some of these. It is to suggest that in this business insofar as it becomes state-sponsored terrorism which internationally may be at least one of the greater threats if it really gets organized against us, that in fact you find the same correlation here that government structures versus democracy are a critical component.

All of that leads to sort of coming to the question well how do you answer some of these two questions and maybe those and how we answer those are sort of a useful question as well for this group in terms of relevance for what you're trying to do and terrorism. And I believe that one way that helps us to think about is to go back to a wonderful little book that we all studied in international relations, the Ken Waltz's Man The State, and War, and that has been picked up as sort of a basic structure of many of the courses in international relations because he divides things into three levels of analysis as he's looking for the cause of war. He said somehow it's a relationship between something that happens in relation to the nature of man, the psychiatry and the psychology level, something about it relates to the nature of government and enough people were writing about that and picked it up but they hadn't really picked up the correlations, and something relates to the nature of the international system, what kind of system is out there.

Those are the three levels of analysis. Well, as you begin to apply this to it, one is led to the questions at least that perhaps this first level of analysis is almost a given on this level in that absence of extraordinary ability to train and educate everyone all over the world and have them grow up in wonderful families and loving families and all the rest, that one may have a wide variety of human beings capable of, if they take power, a wide variety of different kinds of behavior and activities, so you come to the second level of analysis as the first sort of critical variable that we indeed found it was in these correlations of government structure and that the difference between democratic and totalitarian which I think really is the difference between a rule of law controlling government, a government set up to control itself and the nature of the power, where you begin to look at that, that's the critical variable at the state level, at least, and so the whole question of political theory, of the philosophy of what happens in these two regimes -- do you get in the regime the same result that puts in power specialists in violence and those that don't get elected those in fact that rise to top that are very good at killing people like Saddam Hussein. He was the enforcer for the Ba'ath Party and just got a little too good at it and killed his leadership and took over and that's what he functions at. He kills people to stay in power. In addition, there goes along with that a whole philosophy that basically treats the leader as a great leader and a great wonderful person and they're doing the will of God if they succeed in war and there's a whole political construct that goes with it and customarily there goes along with that set of beliefs systems as well the Machiavellian concepts of the end justifies the means and you should cheat and lie and do everything else to be able to achieve these wonderful ends that you have and that you yourself have a great sense of and the rest of the world doesn't know that you're quite prepared in other words to make people happy and you'll kill them if necessary to make them happy by your definition of happiness and the wonderful world as Pol Pot of course demonstrated that he was capable of doing.

Interestingly, there also goes along with that side of it in political theory a lot of anti-modernism. You find it in the Pol Pot and some of his reasons for emptying the city. You find it in Guzmán's Shining Path. You find it in the Unabomber. The Unabomber Manifesto is a perfect parody of it going all the way back to some of the darker side of Rousseau. Rousseau sort of was in both camps, but part of Rousseau was you have to teach people to know what's right and we're just going to force them to do the right thing and people were really happy in nature. It's a
wonderful place and they're really gone to hell in a handbasket once we had all the technology and modernism which is all wrong.

So, part of it, I think, is at that level and I believe if you try to look at the explanations for it, it's two kinds of things. One is that difference in this whole synergy and what it produces between the whole stream of political theory that led to human freedom, that led to democracy, that produces Madison and Locke and all the people on this side. The other one it went through was Rousseau, and elements even of Plato although he was hardly in the right place, and goes through Hegel very influentially, goes through Marx and Hitler and fascism and Habermas and all kinds of others that you can throw out on the other side.

Then you move to the next level of the international system level and you get the other part of the answer. I believe the other part of the answer is about how we are in major wars as democracies. For the most part, it's not a 100% but the most powerful element in it relates again to the incentive structure that are created or not created at the international level. The key is deterrence in all of the broadest sense. We've got the bad guy lights out on Hussein, or like Milosovic the answer is you've got to deter them from the international scene, effectively deter and if you don't deter they are likely to go ahead and carry it out. If you do deter, you're able to stop it whether it's the slaughter or whether it is the major war that they may be planning to start.

In essence, if it is deterrence on that, we're again really asking a question in relation to incentive structures. It's probably more important than anything else how the mechanisms are operating relative to incentives that are altered very dramatically, effected very dramatically by government structures at the national level and at the international system level are effected very dramatically by how the system operates or fails to operate in individual cases. In fact, I would invite you in the current setting with respect to, just go through your own analysis in relation to how would you, if at all, would it have been possible to construct a deterrent model and deterrent policy that would have in fact deterred the events that are going on in Kosovo with the slaughter of the Albanians. None of us know the answer to that. I would at least speculate that I think it might have been possible to deter it and the name of the game at least, if we're to be able to solve these things and deal with them is in fact deterrence, and we might be able to talk about that as to how that would have been structured so that that might have happened.

The question for terrorism, is what is the importance for terrorism in general, whether it is state-sponsored terrorism or whether it is individual groups or even the individual, of the ideology. This distinction between these two political streams of thought is a critical component affecting all of this and if so, is there some way through time in a broad picture for us to be able to deal with that through greater education and democracy or whatever.

The second part of it it seems to me in the real world for most of us, it is likely to be the most important and that gets us a straight to deterrence. To what extent in the problem of terrorism and in all its different dimensions, by the way, I do think that in terms of knowing what we don't want to have happen, we can define it and we don't need to have a grand definition of terrorism in order to say that a variety of kinds of activities we know that we do not want to permit and we want to sanction such as attacks against civil aviation, blowing up bombs in democracies and a whole variety of other kinds of things, and in any event, the question would be to what extent might we, should we be looking at deterrent policies and forms of deterrence and ways of having deterrence become more effective in these settings that might play a role in relation to all of this.

Finally, let me just leave you with one footnote. It's a pragmatic footnote instead of this grand theory and after all this grand theory, if I may just put one little piece of practical, hopefully useful information, on the table. I believe there is one additional treaty that happily has already been drafted that adds to this marginally, adds to the fight against international terrorism. I think all of these are kind of a marginal adding to it. Primarily in the area of building the normative struggle of establishing that certain activities are impermissible in establishing internationally just as with the
Tokyo and the other conventions we established that attacking civil aviation is impermissible, whatever your cause.

I was the one that drafted this as the Convention on International Terrorism for the State Department after the Munich massacre. The Secretary of State charged us to take some actions to see what we could do to come up with some initiatives in response to the Munich massacre. As a counselor on international law, I drew the long or the short straw, however you define it in the legal advisor's office at that point and drafted a convention to prevent the spread of terrorism. It's a very simple concept. It is the concept that you don't fight your struggle on the territory of another state. It's almost a neutrality principle in relation to terrorism. Remember, the PLO at that point, indeed the Black September group, I guess, had attacked the Israeli athletes at the Olympiad at that point, were attacking them on German soil. If you look at a lot of the activities of terrorist groups around the world, there are, I suppose some of the Kurdish groups going all over the world attacking people in embassies in other countries. I think it's trying to delegitimate, make normatively impermissible the idea of being able to do that on this kind of international plane is a useful thing to do. The treaty is there. It is a United States treaty that was put through the U.S. process. It went to the General Assembly although frankly at that point the configuration of states in the world was such that we didn't have any chance of passing it. It was referred by the General Assembly to a committee that was kind of useless. I can still remember the name of the committee. Most of it was focused on the question of dealing with the causes of terrorism, etc. as opposed to trying to stop it, in this case, but let me just suggest that's still there and it would be a useful initiative for the United States government to pick it up. I would change the title so that it becomes something like Treaty to Prevent the Spread of Terrorism. I would work in the United Nations behind the scenes so that you've got four other countries including a group of developing countries and others that were the ones that put it into the United Nations and General Assembly. Indeed, I would be delighted to work with anyone that's interested to resuscitate that. My guess is the legal advisor's office in the State Department would like it. It's just been sitting there. It's one thing that's an easy one for us to move forward with. Thanks very much.